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Abstract 
 
What is the future of the United States dollar within the international monetary system? 
The dollar has certainly enjoyed supremacy as a unit of account, store of value, and 
medium exchange since World War II, but what about new challengers (most notably the 
euro and Chinese yuan)? Using “geoeconomic” analysis to determine what strategies or 
actions a state might pursue in the international political economy can help to begin 
answering these questions. Geoeconomic considerations used in this paper do not dismiss 
cultural, political, or military aspects of international power relations, they supplements 
them. The short-run status of USD preeminence within the international monetary system 
is stable, but medium and long-term prospects are more uncertain. Important currency 
contenders, such as the euro and yuan, raise important political and economic problems 
for the U.S.’s borrowing, policy options, and, ultimately, its national sovereignty. Future 
outcomes and possibilities will be explored to highlight the need for the U.S. to fix its 
domestic issues in order to retain currency supremacy and national control.  
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Preface 
 
In the words of renowned economist John Maynard Keynes:  
 The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, 
the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite 
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some defunct 
economist.1  
 
It is with these prophetic words in mind that I began thinking about my Independent 
Study Project. The affects of changes in the international monetary system, while not 
typically understood by “practical men,” are so far-reaching that I decided to learn more 
about how the system functioned. Following the recent financial crisis and ensuing global 
recession, the stability of the international finance system was called in to serious 
question. As the U.S. is the principal actor in this field (given its size and political and 
physical dominance in the world arena), it seemed fitting to approach this project from 
the standpoint of the U.S. My focus has always been on the combination of political and 
economic forces in the international political economy, and geoeconomic considerations 
play a major part in how I now approach any analysis of international interactions. My 
interests, and the perfect location of Geneva, Switzerland, offered me the opportunity to 
study how these two dynamics interacted, and, ultimately, what the future may look like 
for all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 John Maynard Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936). 
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I. Introduction 
 The recent global financial crisis brought the stability of the international 
monetary system (IMS) to the foreground of international economic debate. Though it 
has been discussed repeatedly in segmented capacities for decades (and truly for 
centuries), the crisis forced an in-depth resurgence of general, economic, and political 
interest in to how the international economic system is structured. The future status of the 
United States dollar (USD) as the international reserve currency, though seemingly not in 
immediate danger of being usurped by another (barring complete financial warfare), is 
highly uncertain. While the USD presently accounts for approximately 60% of 
international currency reserves (with the next closest being the euro at approximately 
24%),2 economists and politicians have brought serious doubt to whether the system 
should rely on the USD.3  
 In early October of 2013, the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) agreed to a 45 billion euro currency swap allowing China and the 
EU to borrow each other’s currencies at a fixed rate.4 Perpetuating such swaps is a major 
step in internationalizing China’s yuan (also known as the renminbi) and is indicative of a 
strong sentiment within the international finance community. Justified by the EU as 
enhancing a “backstop liquidity facility and to reassure euro area banks of the continuous 
provision of Chinese yuan,”5 the two trading giants (the EU is China’s biggest export 
                                                        
2  International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves,” 
http://www.imf.org/External/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.html, (accessed November 4, 2013). 
3 Rupa Duttagupta, and Rishi Goyal, Isabelle Mateos y Lago, “The Debate on the International Monetary System,” IMF 
Staff Position Note No. 2009/26, November 11, 2009, 5. 
4 European Central Bank, “Press Release-ECB and the People’s Bank of China Establish a Bilateral Currency Swap 
Agreement,” October 10, 2013, http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr131010.en.html 
5 Ibid. 
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destination, with €289.7 billion in goods in 2012)6 are pursuing bilateral currency 
agreements that implicitly limit the use of the USD. This is just one of the many 
developments within the IMS that casts a negative light on the perceived stability and 
necessity of the USD. Though the debate on the future of the USD and IMS is far from 
resolved, it is clear that the coming decades will see significant change.  
 As of August 2013, the U.S. owed over 28% ($5.588 trillion) of its GDP to 
foreign holders7 and ran a current account deficit of -2.8% of GDP (approximately $4.39 
billion) in 2012.8 Growing debt and persistent negative current account balances “reduce 
[the U.S.’s] resilience to a host of shocks, political as well as economic.”9 This 
perpetuates the “risk that the United States’ need for external credit will constrain its 
policy options”10 at the hands of some of its biggest, though not so friendly, creditors: 
China, Caribbean Banking Centers, Russia, and Oil Exporters.11 In essence, the role of 
the USD in the IMS can be interpreted as a geopolitical conflict of national sovereignty 
and control. It is worth posing a number of questions regarding the present financial 
system: How did this situation arise? How important is currency status in the IMS and 
domestic economy? What geopolitical motivations and strategies are countries using 
within the IMS? Most importantly, what will be the future role of the USD in the IMS? 
 This paper will begin by addressing the economic and geoeconomic  reasons for 
debate surrounding the USD and present IMS. Part Two will be a brief review of the 
                                                        
6 European Commission, “Fact Sheet: Facts and Figures on EU-China Trade, October 2013,” October 2013, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144591.pdf 
7 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities,” August 2013, 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt) 
8 The World Bank, “Current Account Balance (% of GDP),” 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS, (accessed on October 28, 2013). 
9 Brad Setser, “Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power: The Strategic Consequences of American Indebtedness,” 
Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 37, (2008): 42.  
10 Ibid., 5. 
11 U.S. Department of Treasury, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities.” 
 Millikin 8 
history of the IMS and give contextual substance to the current debate. Part Three will 
describe current domestic U.S. actions affecting the IMS. Part Four will elaborate on the 
U.S.—China relationship and dynamic. Part Five will explain the U.S.—EU connection 
in the context of a rising euro. Finally, the conclusion will summarize and give a few 
additional possibilities for IMS structure. Before reaching the argument, brief research 
methodology, definitions and thesis, and literature review sections will frame the 
contemporary debate on the role of the USD in the IMS. 
 i. Research Methodology 
Research for this paper was completed with interviews and academic research in Geneva, 
Switzerland. Academic research was conducted primarily at the UN Library in Geneva, 
Switzerland and in Nyon, Switzerland. Official reports (from the IMF, World Bank, 
WEF, etc.) were used to provide original data and interpretations from politicians and 
economists regarding the IMS. Following references from these reports, peer-reviewed 
papers and speeches from prominent economists were reviewed alongside official 
research briefings of large banks. Academic research was conducted primarily at the UN 
Library in Geneva, Switzerland and in Nyon, Switzerland.  
 All interviews were conducted in-person with the interviewees’ permission and in 
good faith. One professor from the Graduate Institute of Geneva, one Economic Officer 
from the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development, and two private asset 
managers (who wished to remain anonymous) at prominent Swiss banks were 
interviewed. Interviewees were found and contacted though searches on academic 
institutions’ websites and previous personal contacts. There were no ethical concerns 
with this topic; confidentiality, however, was of the utmost importance to the two bank 
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employees. The combination of official reports, scholarly analysis, and perspective-
building interviews provided a broad range of information for the purposes of this paper. 
This paper will use the far-reaching research methods to develop a multi-faceted analysis 
of the USD, other reserve currencies, and the IMS.  
 ii. Definitions and Thesis 
It is important to start with three basic definitions that will serve as the drivers for this 
paper: the international monetary system, a reserve currency, and geoeconomics. In 
addition, the unpredictable and highly complex nature of the IMS requires a thesis on the 
future of the USD to be dynamic and encompassing of multiple realistic scenarios. In this 
paper, geopolitical considerations on the role of the USD point merely to the fact that the 
IMS is changing and the U.S. must consider the resulting possibilities. 
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines the international monetary 
system (IMS) as the “rules and institutions for international payments” which, more 
specifically, is the “currency/monetary regimes of countries, the rules for intervention if 
an exchange rate is fixed or managed in some way, and the institutions that back those 
rules if there is a problem.”12 The key articulations in this definition are that “rules for 
intervention” exist for “institutions that back those rules.” The IMS is, therefore, not an 
abstract field of interactions, it is a system that directly influences, and potentially 
threatens, national sovereignty and security. With the combination of economic power 
and international competition, countries are able to exert power and control over rival 
countries. 
 Within the IMS, an international reserve currency is, very generally, a currency 
that private investors, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), or Central Banks hold in 
                                                        
12 Duttagupta et al, “The Debate on the International Monetary System,” 5. 
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significant quantities as a medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value. More 
narrowly, the international reserve currency is the USD as it fulfills three very important 
criteria as defined by the IMF: “[1] deep and liquid financial and foreign exchange 
markets that remain resilient during crises, [2] macroeconomic stability to ensure 
confidence in a currency’s long-term purchasing power, [3] wide use in private sector 
transactions.”13 While there are different reasons for each individual country to hold 
reserves, a country’s central bank holdings (usually the USD) act as a key tool for 
managing domestic instability and its foreign exchange rate.14 At the most basic level, the 
USD maintains its role as the international reserve currency due to network 
externalities—“the greater the number of people who use and accept it, the more useful it 
is to everyone, and the more entrenched it becomes.”15 
 Geopolitical factors contributing to the interaction of nations economically can be 
better defined with the term “geoeconomics.” In his landmark definition of “geo-
economics” Edward Lutwak notes the shift in political attention to “methods of 
commerce” that displace “military methods” in the arena of international interaction.16 
Geoeconomics is a metamorphosized version of the closely related “realist” interpretation 
of international relations encompassing both the nature of states and the changing nature 
of their focus.17 This is not to say that states interact geoeconomically following purely 
realist logic, but that, using Helen Thompson’s definition of power as “the ability in 
                                                        
13 Duttagupta et al, “The Debate on the International Monetary System,” 17. 
14 Maurice Obstfeld, Jay Shambaugh, Alan Taylor, 2010, “Financial Stability, the Trilemma, and International 
Reserves,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 57-94. 
15 Richard Cooper, “The Future of the Dollar,” Peterson Institute for International Economics Policy Brief No. PB09-
21, September 2009, 1. 
16 Edward Lutwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce,” The National 
Interest, 20, 1990, 15. 
17 Jean-François Gagné, “Geopolitics in a Post-Cold War Context: From Geo-Strategic to Geo-Economic 
Considerations?” Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, 2007, 5. 
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various forms of one agent to impose its will on another,”18 economic considerations 
must be taken in to serious account when interpreting power dynamics created in the 
international economy. Lutwak’s definition is worth quoting at length to set the 
foundation of international geoeconomic power struggle for the entirety of this paper: 
 
 Fundamentally, states will tend to act “geo-economically” simply because 
of what they are: spatially-defined entities structured to outdo each other 
on the world scene. For all the other functions that states have acquired as 
providers of individual benefits, assorted services, and varied 
infrastructures, their raison d’etre and the ethos that sustains them still 
derive from their chronologically first function: to provide security from 
foes without (as well as outlaws within). [Italics added] 19 
 
This perspective on the nature and importance of economic interaction between states 
serves as a key link to understanding the current debate surrounding the IMS and its 
many facets.   
 iii. Literature Review 
Edward Lutwak’s articulation in 1990 of the geoeconomic interaction of states can be 
further developed to point to how states function internationally. According to Jean-
François Gagné, geoeconomic analysis rests on four key developments in geopolitical 
analysis:  
  
[1]That threats to a State’s national security are first and foremost related to its 
financial and/or commercial dependence on other States… 
 [2]States try to balance power distribution according to their strength, their 
position and their behavior and on the basis of a geo-economic rationale… 
 [3]When a State must choose between economic or military 
considerations, it will opt for the former… 
 [4]States harness their resources in order to deal with fiercer international 
economic competition.20  
                                                        
18 Helen Thompson, “Debt and Power: The United States' Debt in Historical Perspective,” International Relations 21, 
2007, 309. 
19 Edward Lutwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics,” 19. 
20 Jean-François Gagné, “Geopolitics in a Post-Cold War Context,” 13-15. 
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These four assumptions can used to better define how states interact in the IMS as they 
are mostly concerned with increasing their power through “industrial capacities, access to 
and control of natural resources and financing, control of technology and stability of 
political institutions.”21 This is divergent from the realist approach to international 
political economy as states do not exert maximum power and control militarily.22 It is, 
rather, economic power and security that directs much of developed nations’ actions. 
When economic wellbeing replaces military security as the dominant motivator for 
international interaction, the dynamics of economic power must be explored. 
 Though there are certainly alarmists in the field of IMS study who predict the 
collapse of the dollar accompanied by financial chaos,23 general consensus points to a 
stable IMS, at least for now. A (slowly) growing U.S., recovering Europe, and steady 
Chinese economy has quieted the eruption of instability resulting from the financial 
crisis. Current projections do not focus on an abrupt breakdown of the IMS and USD but 
concentrate, rather, on projecting long-term situations in the context of the USD, euro, 
yuan, and the possibility of an alternative international currency.24 Forecasts by Deutsche 
Bank Research, the World Economic Forum (WEF), and the IMF all conclude that any 
shift towards major usage of the yuan would be two decades away and is uncertain.25 The 
euro may play an increasing role as an international reserve currency, but this is also 
                                                        
21 Jean-François Gagné, “Geopolitics in a Post-Cold War Context,” 14. 
22 Helen Thompson, “Debt and Power,” 314. 
23 See: Charles Goyette, “The Dollar Meltdown: Surviving the Impending Currency Crisis with Gold, Oil, and Other 
Unconventional Investments,” (New York, New York: Penguin Group, 2009). 
24 Richard Cooper, “The Future of the Dollar,” 6. 
25 See: Duttagupta et al, “The Debate on the International Monetary System”; World Economic Forum, “Euro, Dollar, 
Yuan Uncertainties: Scenarios on the Future of the International Monetary System,” World Scenario Series, 2012; and 
Markus Jaeger, “Yuan as a Reserve Currency,” Deutsche Bank Research Briefing, 2010. 
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uncertain given the current political climate, sovereign debt crisis, and growth forecasts.26  
 Finally, within the U.S. there is considerable debate on the implications of its 
current deficit and debt levels. In a Council on Foreign Relations report, Brad Setser sees 
U.S. reliance on foreign financing as a “strategic vulnerability…[rather than a] strategic 
asset”27 to allude to the possibility of future infringements on U.S. sovereignty. In close 
agreement, Helen Thompson of Cambridge University believes the dynamic of Chinese-
held U.S. debt has “fundamentally changed the political terms on which the U.S. has 
borrowed since the 1960s.”28 Slightly tempering these qualms of independence is noted 
Harvard economist Lawrence Summers’ argument that a “balance of financial terror”29 
exists between the U.S. and its creditors, as a downturn in the U.S. invariably exacts 
tremendous costs on their economies. In addition, the short and medium-term might not 
hold significant international economic threats for the U.S.; these threats may be 
primarily domestic.30 These domestic threats will be explored in a later section. 
 The present geoeconomic, economic, and political challenges facing the IMS is 
certainly cause for debate on its future. The system has surely not been a stable one over 
the past century of economic, political, and military upheaval. A brief history will be 
explained to give context to the current debate. 
  
II. Context and History 
                                                        
26 Duttagupta et al, “The Debate on the International Monetary System;” World Economic Forum, “Euro, Dollar, Yuan 
Uncertainties;” Markus Jaeger, “Yuan as a Reserve Currency.” 
27 Brad Setser, “Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power,” 4. 
28 Helen Thompson, “Debt and Power,” 305. 
29 Lawrence Summers, “The U.S. Current Account Deficit and the Global Economy,” The Per Jacobsson Foundation 
Lecture, October 3, 2004, 8. 
30 Cedric Tille, interviewed by Cullen Millikin, October 30, 2013.  
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The modern history of the IMS and currencies can, for the purposes of this paper, be 
summarized by the following eras: pre-World War I, 1870-1914; the inter-war period, 
1919-1939; the Bretton Woods system, 1945-1971; and the Post Bretton Woods order, 
1971-present. A brief overview of the monetary system in each period will show the 
similarities and differences compared to today’s system.  
 i. Pre-World War 1, 1870-1914 
The period of 1870-1914 is typically defined as the “Classical Gold Standard”31 and was 
an era of a relatively stable IMS. Currencies were backed by gold in a fixed exchange 
rate regime and successfully fulfilled the three basic requirements of “money”: as a 
medium of exchange, as a unit of account, and as a store of value.32 From an economic 
standpoint, it was a period of great expansion, improvement, and growth. Most nations 
chose to join the standard where “competitive manipulation of exchange rates was rare, 
international trade showed record growth rates, balance-of-payments problems were 
few…and unemployment remained fairly low.”33 Though backed by gold, in this period 
“about 60% of world trade was invoiced and settled in [pound] sterling.”34 There is some 
debate as to when the sterling fell to the USD as the international reserve currency. 
Recent work by Barry Eichengreen (of U.C. Berkeley) and Marc Flandreau (of the 
Graduate Institute of Geneva) has shown that the sterling and USD may have shared 
                                                        
31 James Rickards, “Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis,” (New York, New York: Penguin Group, 
2012), 43. 
32Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, “The International Monetary System 1870-1973,” International Economics: 
Theory and Policy, Sixth Edition, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 2003). 
33 Giulio M. Gallarotti, “The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical Gold Standard 1880-1914,” 
(New York, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1995), 18. 
34 David Williams, “The Evolution of the Sterling System,” in C.R. Whitlesey and J.S.G Wilson, eds, Essays in Money 
and Banking, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 268. 
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reserve status for most of the 1920s.35 This is a very significant point, as they draw the 
conclusion that “there is no reason therefore why the dollar and the euro, notwithstanding 
their respective recent difficulties, cannot both be consequential international 
currencies.”36 With respect to IMS stability, the onset of World War I caused this halcyon 
age to end, never to return. 
 ii. Inter-War Period, 1919-1939 
The interwar period of 1919-1939 had two central components, the rise of the USD and 
massive economic instability. The U.S. Federal Reserve System was created in 1913 
which, in conjunction with massive wartime debts of European nations (most notably 
Great Britain), ushered in the era of U.S. dominance in the IMS. Problems such as re-
pegging to gold, floating exchange rates, and economic destruction caused enormous 
damage to countries across the globe as protectionist measures and aggressive monetary 
policies dominated international relations. One of the stated purposes of the IMF (created 
at the end of World War II) was to prevent and “avoid [the] competitive exchange 
depreciation” which occurred during this period.37 Hyperinflation in the Weimar 
Republic of Germany resulted from the floating of the German mark following World 
War I and destroyed Germany’s economy. Though advantages in moderate inflation (and, 
thus, currency depreciation) would have allowed Germany to export more and pay back 
hefty wartime reparations, hyperinflation destroyed the lives of citizens and 
“strengthened the hand of German industrialists who controlled hard assets”38 –
                                                        
35 See: Barry Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, “The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Rise of the Dollar as 
an International Currency 1914-1939,” Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies Working Paper 
No: 16/2010, August 2010, 1-28. 
36 Barry Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, “The Federal Reserve…,” 2. 
37 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article 1 Sec. 3, 
Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2011. 
38 James Rickards, “Currency Wars,” 60. 
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essentially priming the pump for the Nazi Party’s ascension of power. In the U.S., bank 
runs and the Great Depression caused President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to use 
extreme measures with Executive Orders to seize gold assets in the U.S. and to eventually 
devalue the USD against gold.39 The goal of this devaluation was to make U.S. goods 
cheaper for other nations and, thus, allow the U.S. to increase its domestic productivity 
and exports to pull itself out of the Great Depression. The contagion of this domestic 
monetary policy effected all nations involved in the wars, as they had become more 
interconnected in the pre-World War I era. This was a period of great economic mistrust 
and animosity between nations as recovery and trade was seen as a zero-sum game. As is 
readily known, the closing of World War II was supplemented by the Allied nations’ 
economic cooperation via the Bretton Woods system. 
 iii. The Bretton Woods System, 1945-1971 
The Bretton Woods era of 1945-1971 “was on the whole a period of currency stability, 
low inflation, low unemployment, high growth and rising real incomes.”40 Though 
recessions were recorded in the U.S. and United Kingdom about every three to five years, 
fixing the USD to gold at $35 per ounce with other currencies pegged against the USD 
provided both stability and maneuverability. Article IV of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
focuses on the “obligations [of the Fund] regarding exchange arrangements”41 and 
permits the “introduction of a widespread system of exchange arrangements based on 
stable but adjustable par values.”42 This, in essence, required members to intervene in 
currency markets to keep their declared value of currency within a “band” (range) of one 
                                                        
39 James Rickards, “Currency Wars,” 70. 
40 James Rickards, “Currency Wars,” 78. 
41  International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article 4. 
42  International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Article 4 Sec. 4. 
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percent above or below its declared value.43 This gave member nations the responsibility 
to hold enough reserves to maintain their peg to the dollar while also giving them slight 
maneuverability and ability to devalue their currency given extreme circumstances. The 
Bretton Woods system did not prove infallible in the face of international monetary 
instability—the so-called “gold window” beginning in 1968 when the open-market price 
of gold was higher than the fixed exchangeability rate of $3544—ultimately ended in 
1971 with President Nixon’s declaration that the USD would no longer be convertible 
into gold by central banks. Subsequent devaluations in 1973 of the USD against 
European currencies caused major European countries (notably Germany, Switzerland, 
and Britain) to float their currencies against the dollar to effectively end the Bretton 
Woods system.45 
 iv. The Post-Bretton Woods Order, 1971-Present 
The effect of major global currencies floating against each other defined the post Bretton 
Woods era of 1971-present. International competitiveness for financial centers and 
investment implicitly forced many countries to liberalize capital controls and regulations 
to avoid being neglected by international investors.46 The state of the U.S. economy in 
the late 1970s, “stagflation” and an appreciating dollar, caused the U.S. to actively 
intervene in the foreign exchange market to bring its value back down to a level where it 
could help the country compete internationally.47 Developing nations in Latin America 
established Currency Boards in attempt to maintain their countries’ peg to the dollar 
                                                        
43 Benjamin Cohen, “Bretton Woods System,” in R.J. Barry Jones (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of International 
Political Economy (New York , New York: Routledge, 2002). 
44 James Rickards, “Currency Wars,” 86. 
45 Barry Eichengreen, “Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International 
Monetary System,” (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 131. 
46 Barry Eichengreen, “Exorbitant Privelege,” 135.  
47 Barry Eichengreen, “Exorbitant Privelege,” 143.  
 Millikin 18 
while South East Asian countries focused on liberalizing their economies to spur foreign 
direct investment (FDI). Simultaneous liberalization of capital controls and maintaining 
domestic currency stability proved difficult for many developing nations. Europe, 
meanwhile, was busy integrating its economies and monetary policies in order to achieve 
greater currency stability. Though these efforts were largely tumultuous and unsuccessful 
in the 1970s, in the 1980s the major economies of France and Germany were successful 
in moving towards the monetary and political union of the present-day European Union. 
Though the euro emerged as a major contender against the USD, the present IMS relies 
on the USD and its underlying political stability. 
 
III. The Domestic United States 
The U.S. is the central actor in the IMS and, thus, is discussed constantly in regards to its 
domestic policies and international position. The recent financial crisis’ origin in the U.S. 
and contagion to the rest of the world has intensified research, predictions, and discourse 
on whether the future holds stability for the USD and IMS.48 First, the benefits and 
drawbacks to the U.S. from being a Reserve Currency Country (RCC) will be explained. 
Second, the “twin deficits” (current account deficit and budget deficit) with respect to 
perceived stability and longevity will be explored. Lastly, the issue of large amounts 
foreign held debt will be argued to pose a geopolitical and geoeconomic vulnerability to 
other nations for the U.S. in the future. 
 i. Benefits and Drawbacks of being a RCC  
There are many benefits for the U.S. being the main RCC, with net positive influence on 
the U.S. economy conservatively estimated to be between .3% and .5% of U.S. GDP 
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(approximately $50 billion to $75 billion) per year.49 The two main benefits to the U.S. 
are seigniorage and the extension of low interest loans to the U.S. government and private 
sector. First, seigniorage benefits are earned by the spread between production and value 
of dollars, essentially, due to the “interest-free loans generated by issuing additional 
currency to nonresidents who hold US notes and coins”50 to the benefit of the U.S.’s 
financial position. Second, foreign purchases of U.S. Treasury Bills push down interest 
rates and effectively allow the government, households, and corporations to borrow at 
cheaper rates than would be indicated by the U.S.’s fiscal state and current account 
balance.51 In addition to these main benefits, the ability to profit from borrowing cheaply 
and lending at higher rates in riskier investments (FDI and equity) has earned the 
classification of the U.S. as the “world’s venture capitalist.”52 Though it can be argued 
that this benefit is due to a risk premium, not reserve currency status,53 “the U.S. balance 
sheet increasingly… [holds] high-return risky investments on the asset side.54 In terms of 
outstanding debt, the denomination of loans in USD offers supreme advantage to the U.S. 
Loans in USD effectively “shift the exchange rate exposure to the rest of the world”55as 
lenders are highly sensitive to the USD’s value for repayment. Similarly, when foreigners 
hold U.S. debt, depreciation in the USD decreases the value of their loan and allows the 
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U.S. to pay it back with “cheaper” dollars.56 Benefits to the U.S. economy of its RCC 
status, while notable, are accompanied by drawbacks. 
 The central cost to the U.S. being the RCC is the overvaluation of the USD due to 
“greater inflows of foreign capital” causing the “dollar exchange rate [to be] higher than 
it would be without reserve currency status.”57 The exchange rate has deep implications 
for international competitiveness and growth—if the USD is overvalued (current 
estimates are at 5% to 10%),58 producers have either lower profit margins or are passed 
over entirely due to the expense of importing U.S. products. In addition, the economic 
influence of U.S. monetary and fiscal policies is integral to the stability and state of the 
IMS. When “international opinion may be more demanding than domestic opinion [in 
regards to monetary policy],59 the U.S. finds itself in a position of “strategic 
vulnerability…[due to its] current reliance on other governments for financing.”60 This 
geopolitical issue of sovereignty with geoeconomic foundations will be addressed after 
contextualizing these fears with the twin deficits. 
 ii. The Twin Deficits 
The U.S.’s budget deficit ($680 billion for Fiscal Year 2013)61 and current account deficit 
(aforementioned at -2.8% of GDP) is cause for concern to many studying the IMS. 
Coupled with the U.S. Government’s shutdown and possible default in October 2013, the 
use of the USD as a reliable reserve currency has been called in to serious question.  
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 The perception of U.S. Treasury bills as a “no-risk” asset has allowed the U.S. to 
run persistent budget deficits without significant fear of losing financing.62 Theoretically, 
as long as investors believe the U.S. will pay back loans fully, on-time, and with a 
reasonable currency valuation, the U.S. could run even larger budget deficits. Though the 
degree to which this ability has added to the U.S.’s budget deficits is disputed, basic 
economic theory dictates that the ability to borrow at low rates encourages spending. This 
perceived risk level, however, is increasingly unsteady when coupled with domestic 
political gridlock and outstanding liabilities to entitlement programs.63 The long-standing 
ability of the U.S. to borrow cheaply may prove dangerous. Over borrowing could cause 
a decline in market trust of the U.S. government to service its debt and would damage 
international purchases of its Treasury securities to, therefore, increase interest rates. 
Current domestic political will power to reduce spending and increase revenues is by no 
means steady as the Federal Reserve and U.S. government favor domestic prosperity over 
international stability.64 Related to wavering international sentiment of U.S. debt is its 
persistent practice of importing more than it exports. 
 A current account deficit is defined as the imports exceeding exports, or between 
net national savings and net national investment. A deficit reflects an inward flow of 
capital to the country. For emerging markets or industries, this may be used as a proxy for 
a heightened belief in the  growth potential. In the case of the U.S., however, Lawrence 
Summers has shown that “net investment has declined over the last four or five years in 
the United States,” which implies that increasing current account deficits are due to 
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“reduced savings and increased consumption.”65 While this difference appears 
inappreciable, it indicates that the U.S. is fueling its own current account deficits and not 
enticing increased investment. What is the problem associated with this type of deficit? 
Deficits place increased strain upon a country in terms of long-term loan rates as they are 
seen as structurally unable to pay back loans. Baseline projections on American growth 
and consumption patterns prove this to be an unsustainable (not self-correcting) deficit. 
To international investors and Central Banks, this large current account deficit fuels 
uncertainty—something currency investors are not prone to accept.  
 The debate is not centered on whether the U.S.’s twin deficit is sustainable, few 
would dispute this; the contention among economists is about the consequences.66 
Current and future projections describe the problems the U.S.’s domestic policies pose on 
its sovereignty and role as the major RCC. 
 iii. Foreign Held Debt 
The argument for an inevitable decline of U.S. power resulting from persistent budget 
deficits is not a new one—Paul Kennedy’s analysis of relative decline to the Soviet 
Union and Japan was immensely popular, but in the 1980s.67 The present situation, 
however, is not one of projected decline, but of the intensely unique circumstance of the 
U.S. becoming significantly indebted to the world’s rising power, China.68 The two 
diametrically opposed arguments for the geopolitical consequences for foreign holdings 
of U.S. debt are the “liberal internationalist” stance of increased integration bringing 
growing stability and the more “realist” position of greater strategic vulnerability. While 
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many liberal trade economists and politicians somewhat correctly assert that increased 
financial interdependence brings stability, the nature of power dynamics in the 
international economy point to this interdependence creating possible constraints for U.S. 
policy in the future.69 
 In typical lending cases, creditors work to require structural changes among the 
debtor to provide future stability and to “get their house in order.”70 Though the U.S. is in 
a markedly different circumstance, the U.S. is in the unique position of being able to 
devalue its currency and thus lower its external debt requirements. This opposes 
American and creditor nations’ (most significantly China) interests and brings strong 
potential for conflict. The situation is currently stable as China has not stopped 
purchasing U.S. securities or shifted its holding composition, but Chinese interests “lie in 
the American government pushing the burden of adjustment onto American citizens, 
something which, by reducing American domestic demand would hurt Chinese 
exports.”71 Though this may seem like a vindication of the liberal argument, in the event 
of Chinese action to assure repayment of U.S. debt and higher U.S. interest rates, 
“creditors have political leverage to make threats… [that] can be an effective instrument 
of hard power.”72 In the IMS, where countries are highly sensitive to future valuations, a 
threat can be as influential as an act in “dumping” or redistributing holdings.73 Conflict 
with China as a significantly different nation both ideologically and economically stems 
from the combination of U.S. domestic concerns coupled with international interaction. 
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IV. U.S.—China Relationship 
Research projections on the future of the IMS focus on the currently debated future of the 
yuan. There are realistic reasons to believe the yuan will grow in proportion of reserve 
holdings over the next few decades. Any analysis of the future of the IMS must take in to 
account the changes this would bring. The Chinese government has taken major steps to 
internationalize usage of the yuan (such as allowing foreign investor to trade in its stock 
exchange)74 and have professed strong desire to move away from a system dominated by 
the USD.75 Significant challenges face China in becoming a major player in the IMS and 
subsequently threaten the U.S. First, domestic complications in China will be detailed to 
explain roadblocks with the yuan becoming a reserve currency. Second, the geoeconomic 
conflict between the U.S. and China will highlight the necessity of the U.S. to consider 
strategic vulnerabilities with a rise in yuan usage. Third, the future relationship of the 
U.S. and China will show the developing nature of its unique situation.  
 i. Complications with Yuan Becoming a Reserve Currency 
Issues with major international usage of the yuan are focused upon three lacking areas: 
first, an export-oriented growth model; second, an under-developed financial sector; and 
third, capital controls with the lack of rule of law. For the first, China faces an economic 
difficulty whose underlying theme has long been present in the field of international 
relations: domestic self-sufficiency. Though strong growth since 1978 (the beginning of 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) has increased GDP per capita more than ten-fold to 
$6,118 in 2012,76 the export-led nature of its economy may be now yielding some 
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limitations.77 This has been articulated in Chapter Four of China’s Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan as “establish[ing a] long term mechanism of expanding domestic demand.”78 
Chapter Ten of Machiavelli’s The Prince focuses on this issue of independence;  “It is 
necessary to consider another point in examining the character of these principalities: that 
is, whether a prince has such power that, in case of need, he can support himself with his 
own resources, or whether he has always need of the assistance of others.”79 Without a 
domestic demand-based economy, China is unready to assume the responsibilities 
associated with being a RCC.  
 Second, China’s financial sector is at odds with supporting major trading and the 
safety of foreign exchange reserves. China will need to implement domestic institutional 
reforms, such as central bank independence, inflation targeting, and a more liberalized 
banking center.80 This causes ownership problems, however, as these reforms require the 
government “to implement a host of secondary reforms aimed at ensuring financial sector 
stability post-convertibility… and accept a significant diminution of direct control over 
the financial system.”81 Indeed, it appears that China’s stated aim to “strengthen and 
improve macro-control… [and] the coordination of fiscal, monetary, investment, 
industrial and land policy”82 to manage growth and control inflation are at odds with this 
liberalization. 
 Third, capital controls are a major roadblock to internationalizing the yuan and 
must be overcome if there is to be any serious usage of the yuan in international 
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transactions. An open capital account with full convertibility would mean ending Chinese 
restrictions on capital flows (FDI and other investments) and allowing currency 
conversions to which foreigners currently have limited access and citizens are 
regulated.83 The domestic bond market and foreign exchange markets are also small 
relative to the stresses that would be exerted upon them by negative shocks. These 
restrictions, though economically important to China’s development, are signals of 
political aversion to a strict rule of law. Current prosecutions, most famously Bo Xilai’s 
conviction of corruption,84 have shown progress of maintaining a rule of law to other 
countries, China’s “regulatory enforcement” score by the World Justice Project is below 
many countries in its income group such as Serbia, Russia, and Mexico.85 With these 
multiple difficulties in mind it seems unlikely, even impossible, for the yuan to emerge as 
a reserve currency before enacting major reforms that could take upwards of two 
decades.86 Though its status as a RCC is limited in the short-term, this does not mean 
China is irrelevant to the IMS and U.S. 
 ii. Geoeconomic Conflict  
Chinese actions in the international economy may be interpreted as a long-term pursuit of 
greater power with a short-term nod to stability. Simultaneously acting as the U.S.’s main 
creditor and opposing Eastern power creates a unique dynamic not seen in contemporary 
political economy. Rising nations in the past (Spain in the 16th century and France in the 
18th century), have used debt to finance a rise to power before being weakened externally 
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when they could no longer fund fiscal deficits for domestic reasons.87 While Spain and 
France fell from military failings, the duality of increased Chinese holdings of U.S. debt 
and its own economic rise in other parts of the globe point to the new warfare of 
geoeconomics. As documented in Thompson’s analysis of the role of debt to the finance 
power ascension of Spain, France, and Great Britain, “whether borrowing weakens or 
strengthens a state will depend not on the amount of the debt a state assumes, whether 
domestic or foreign, but its ability to service that debt.”88 This ability depends on the 
borrowing state’s credibility as a debtor to reform and align domestic policies with 
creditors’ desires. Within the IMS, further development of the Chinese domestic market 
and other exporting destinations (such as Europe, the Middle East, India, etc.) seems only 
to lead to greater Chinese power at the expense of the U.S. The Chinese have been very 
successful at gaining market-share and technological advantages. 
 Under geoeconomic assumptions, states think about penetrating new markets in 
much the same way that states think about occupying a new territory.89 From the Art of 
War, “in the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole 
and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.”90 Strategic inclusion or investment in 
a specific market (such as state-owned Chinese firm investing in Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
resource and infrastructure sectors)91 serves the country as a way to gain economic 
influence; with economic influence comes political influence. China has been 
concurrently developing exporting lines to countries other than the U.S. (mostly the EU, 
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Hong Kong, and ASEAN countries),92 using its sovereign wealth fund (SWF) to gain 
technological, competitive, and political influence,93 and securing energy supplies within 
the oil producing regions of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. 
China’s massive investments in infrastructure linking it to “its energy-rich neighbors, 
most notably Russia… have inevitably extended its geopolitical reach and influence. A 
more consolidated strategic partnership between China and Russia represents the greatest 
potential threat to western dominance.”94 Chinese strategic interests for energy security, 
economic growth, and diplomatic influence diverge form U.S. power and economic 
security. 
 iii. Future Relationship 
In 2011, China surpassed Japan as the U.S.’s largest creditor through U.S. Treasury 
securities.95 As mentioned previously, affects of U.S. indebtedness to China have not yet 
borne significant policy alterations or domestic instability for the U.S. The recent decade 
of Chinese growth and only moderate upward valuation of the yuan has brought serious 
allegations that China is artificially keeping its currency undervalued against the USD 
and euro. China has been intervening in foreign exchange markets to keep the yuan 
“significantly undervalued” to the benefit of Chinese exporters, according the U.S. 
Department of Treasury’s 2013 report on exchange rate policies.96 The issue of 
intervention in the foreign exchange market is not particular to China—intervention to 
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devalue currencies to spur export growth is know as competitive devaluation, or 
“currency wars.”97 In regards to what China may do currently with its foreign exchange 
interventions, none are wildly destabilizing or unfixable for the U.S. 
 Presently, there are three main economic changes in Chinese actions that would 
destabilize the U.S. in the short-term and act as an effort towards making the yuan more 
widely used. Outlined by Harvard University’s Richard Cooper: 
[1] China could simply stop intervening in the foreign exchange market to acquire 
additional dollars or any other currency.[2]The Chinese could switch their foreign 
exchange intervention from dollars to euros or yen or some other 
currencies.[3]China could change the composition of its large reserves from one 
dollar security to another.98 
 
The first, non-intervention, would largely benefit U.S. exporters and is the stated desire 
of U.S. politicians and economists—it does not seem likely that China will give this boon 
to the U.S. The second, shifting purchases to currencies other than the USD, would result 
in the appreciation of (most likely) the euro, yen (JPY), or even the yuan. This would also 
benefit the U.S., but would be vehemently opposed by the EU and counteracted with its 
own currency intervention to protect sputtering domestic growth. The third, changing the 
composition of its holdings, would according to Cooper, “temporarily disequilibrate the 
market. [However,] once US authorities learned what the Chinese were doing, they could 
reverse it through their own actions.”99 These short-term scenarios point to stability in the 
economic relations of China and the U.S. If the Chinese are successful in implementing 
the aforementioned structural reforms, however, geopolitical concerns of strategic 
vulnerabilities and conflicts must be taken in to account.  
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V. U.S.—EU Relationship 
The U.S. and EU are inexorably linked politically, ideologically, and economically. 
Following the creation of the euro, exuberant proponents projected its use to overcome 
the USD in international transactions as the world’s dominant currency.100 These hopes 
have clearly been dashed following the raucous instability and loss of credibility 
following the global crisis in 2008 and sovereign debt crisis of 2009. The creation of the 
euro in 1999 immediately encompassed 18% of allocated total foreign exchange 
holdings–due mainly to the merging of the Deutsche mark and French Franc.101 It has 
since grown to account for approximately 24% of official reserves and brings with it deep 
uncertainty as to the potential consequences for the USD.102 Though surpassing the USD 
as the dominant currency is highly unlikely, the euro holds significant value in the IMS 
and usage in the Eurozone and its periphery warrants its thoughtful consideration. First, 
issues of EU governance will be discussed to show weaknesses in the euro’s macro-
management. Second, an analysis of the future of the euro in the IMS will highlight its 
limitations. 
 i. European Governance Issues 
The issue of fiscal sovereignty is one of the central difficulties in the economic 
governance of the EU.103 Though the EU has successfully created a monetary union with 
its own central bank, the problem of fiscal independence has created an environment 
wherein a nation has the capability to sink the monetary union due to its own 
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irresponsibility. With the creation of the euro and convergence of borrowing rates, 
countries that had been “profligate and had defaulted on debt or devalued their 
currencies, such as Greece or Spain,”104 now had the ability to borrow at rates very close 
to those enjoyed by fiscally prudent nations like Germany. World-renowned sovereign 
debt restructuring specialist Lee Buchheit notes that when politicians are given the ability 
to borrow unlimited amounts of money at extremely low rates, politicians will borrow 
unlimited amounts of money.105 This high pre-crisis level of Greek borrowing triggered 
the financial crisis and credit crunch of 2009 leading to intense distress and the biggest 
sovereign debt restructuring ever recorded.106 Misalignment of governance and interests 
impinges strong doubt on international investors as to the stability and security of euro 
holdings.  
 The European Commission and European leaders have been working vigorously 
to enact reform to strengthen “economic and fiscal governance.”107 All EU members 
signed the “Fiscal Compact” in 2012 that “is intended to foster budgetary discipline, to 
strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the 
euro area.”108 Article Three of the Fiscal Compact intends to make budgetary restrictions 
part of national law “through provisions of binding force and permanent character, 
preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to 
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throughout the national budgetary processes.”109 Proponents of the Compact hail its 
ability to restore positive sentiment and help growth. Skeptics see little improvement in 
enforcement mechanisms and see its weaknesses in times of strain as ultimately the same 
as the pact that preceded it. Even so, budgetary prudence in response to Northern 
Europe’s bailout of crisis-afflicted nations in 2009110 is critical to reestablishing 
credibility in the stability and long-term viability of investing in euros. What, then, might 
the future hold for the euro in the IMS? 
 ii. Future of the Euro? 
Loss of confidence in EU political cohesion and fiscal impropriety in Portugal, Italy, 
Ireland, Greece, and Spain following the 2009 crisis has left IMS experts skeptical about 
increasing the role of the euro in the IMS in the short and medium-term. In addition to 
governance concerns, “while the total Eurozone sovereign debt market is comparable in 
size to the US treasury market,” difference in national market rates indicate that the EU’s 
total “depth and liquidity is much smaller, limiting its ability to act as an international 
reserve currency.”111 The European Central Bank’s (ECB) July 2013 report on the 
international role of the euro states that, “in international debt markets, the share of the 
euro declined somewhat in 2012 as tensions in the euro area sovereign debt market 
possibly dented the appetite for new international debt issuance denominated in euro.”112  
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 Further internationalization of the euro to penetrate market usage outside of the 
EU, its periphery, and parts of Northern Africa remains doubtful.113 In regards to possible 
future (15-20 years) rise of the Chinese yuan, the euro looks especially lackluster due to 
demographic and economic growth projections. The WEF’s European 2020 
Competitiveness Report concludes that “competitiveness should lie at the heart of 
Europe’s economic agenda”114—for without the “necessary reforms and undertaking the 
investments”115 to make all members more competitive, the EU will remain vulnerable to 
crises. Wage growth and low productivity in periphery countries has caused massive 
internal imbalances leaving Nordic and Western countries (using the WEF’s 
classifications)116 such as Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, and Belgium, with much 
stronger outlooks for the future. These disparities in present and future economic statuses 
continue to hold back prospects for political cohesion and, therefore, increased euro 
usage.  
 
VII. Conclusion and Future Possibilities 
The future of the IMS in relation to the USD, while uncertain, is relatively stable in the 
short-term. Network externalities have developed massive inertia behind the USDs usage 
in international transactions and as the dominant reserve currency. China’s small 
financial market and export-led economy necessitate major structural reforms over the 
next few decades. Growth potential and strategic market capture, however, render China 
poised to become an important player within the IMS in about two decades. For this 
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reason, the U.S. must fix its twin deficit problem and put itself on a sustainable path to 
reduce its foreign held debt. What is presently a unique situation in history (the world’s 
dominant power being indebted to the world’s rising power)117 may turn in to a severe 
geopolitical conflict for power and influence in decades to come. The U.S.’s strongest 
ally, the EU, might play a similar regional monetary buffer as it did as a physical cushion 
between the U.S. and Soviet Russia during the Cold War. Prospects for increased usage 
of the euro in foreign transactions and official holdings seem dim, but not impossible. If 
traditional currency statuses are uncertain in the future, what are possible changes to the 
IMS? 
 i. The SDR 
The Special Drawing Right (SDR) is an international reserve asset “created by the IMF in 
1969 to supplement its member countries' official reserves. Its value is based on a basket 
of four key international currencies [the USD, euro, JPY, and sterling], and SDRs can be 
exchanged for freely usable currencies.”118 The SDR has been issued in three periods, 
1970-1972, 1979-1981, and 2009, to IMF members currently with 204 billion SDRs in 
existence.119 In practice, the SDR is neither a currency, nor a claim on the IMF; it is a 
potential claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members.120In function, the SDR 
has acted as the unit of account for the IMF over the past four decades. Recent calls from 
China to make the SDR’s role in the IMS more pronounced121 have returned it to the 
forefront of IMS reform. Proponents of a system with an increased role for the SDR 
believe that its disconnect “from individual nations [would allow it] to remain stable in 
                                                        
117 Helen Thompson, “Debt and Power,” 305. 
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119 The International Monetary Fund, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) Fact Sheet. 
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the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based 
national currencies.”122 Critics, however, see a shift towards the SDR as inherently 
unworkable, as “fundamental aspects of any reserve currency are the fiscal capacity of 
the issuing country and the liquidity and market reliability of its treasury bonds.”123 
 Though different economic problems associated with the SDR—lack of liquidity, 
debt issuance, and market capitalization— are certainly roadblocks, the political strength 
required to shift towards major usage of the SDR makes it unrealistic. Conflict over 
increasing the IMF’s role in the IMS can be viewed as intrinsically geoeconomic. History 
has already seen this conflict in 1972 during the IMF’s Committee of Twenty (C-20) 
meeting following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. Though the prevailing 
international view was one of increasing the IMF’s control, “the United States was not 
prepared to consign the advantages it accrued from issuing the world’s reserve currency, 
at least not without much-stronger assurances that it could rely on the rest of the world to 
adjust when needed.”124 The likelihood of the U.S. ceding its power as the dominant 
reserve currency is very low.125 Further implementation of the SDR would also limit the 
ability of countries to use their nominal exchange rates to make “necessary adjustments 
in response to asymmetric shocks [such as a recession].”126 For economic and 
geoeconomic reasons of power and control, the U.S. Federal Reserve will not outsource 
to the IMF its right to decide monetary policy.127 
 iii. Geoeconomics of the Future 
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Contemporary geopolitical analysis includes geoeconomic factors to better reflect the 
changed nature of how international state and non-state actors interact. Issues of national 
sovereignty are inherent in the geoeconomic debate over how states interact; it does not 
dismiss cultural, political, or military aspects, it supplements them. When “states seek to 
protect their national economic system, to obtain and master important technologies, to 
penetrate new markets and to maintain a predominant power position in traditional 
markets,”128 they are acting geoeconomically within the realm of geopolitics. Related to 
the USD’s role in the IMS, the U.S.’s large external debt poses a long-term problem of 
national sovereignty and influence.  
 Even in the face of political and economic frustrations, the euro will remain 
dominant within Europe and its periphery. An internationalized yuan, though presently 
unfeasible, will allow future investors to avoid purchasing U.S. debt if they fear the U.S. 
could default. This is an option not available since the switch from sterling to USD before 
World War II, as no major currency has challenged the USD’s preeminence in the IMS. 
The future of the USD is in the hands of both domestic and external policy decisions, but 
is primarily one of U.S. concern. 
 Along these lines, the future of the IMS may be destined for a multipolar system 
relying on the USD supplemented by a combination of the euro and yuan. Continuing 
deterioration of the U.S. financial position (increasing twin deficits and the possibility of 
inflation) would warrant greater desire for other currency holdings. The euro, though its 
shortcomings have been discussed, is the major alternative to the USD and may be able to 
play a larger role in reserve compositions, much like the USD and sterling during the 
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1920s and 1930s.129 The liquidity of European bond markets offers a realistic substitute 
for the U.S. but it is still unlikely to overtake the USD as the dominant reserve and 
transaction currency. The future may remain uncertain for the USD and IMS, but U.S. 
politicians and economists must realize the dangers of placing short-term control above 
long-term influence. Without its present level of dictation over the world’s monetary 
policy, the U.S.’s international influence will wane.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
129 Barry Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, “The Federal Reserve…,” 19-20. 
 Millikin 38 
Bibliography 
 
“The Fiscal Compact and the European constitutions: ‘Europe speaking German,’” 
 European Constitutional Law Review, 8: 1–8, 2012. 
 
Anonymous 1, interviewed by Cullen Millikin, November 6, 2013. 
 
Anonymous 2, interviewed by Cullen Millikin, November 7, 2013. 
 
Barry Eichengreen, “Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future 
 of the International Monetary System,” (New York, New York: Oxford 
 University Press, 2011). 
 
Barry Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, “The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the 
 Rise of the Dollar as an International Currency 1914-1939,” Graduate Institute of 
 International and Development Studies Working Paper No: 16/2010, August 
 2010, 1-28. 
 
Benjamin Cohen, “Bretton Woods System,” in R.J. Barry Jones (ed.), Routledge 
 Encyclopedia of International Political Economy (New York , New York: 
 Routledge, 2002). 
 
Benjamin Cohen, “The Euro Today: Is There a Tomorrow?” Working Paper, 
 http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/faculty/cohen/working/pdfs/Berlin_WP_6-13.pdf. 
 
Brad Setser, “Sovereign Wealth and Sovereign Power: The Strategic Consequences of 
 American Indebtedness,” Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 37, 
 (2008): 1-68.  
 
Cedric Tille, interviewed by Cullen Millikin, October 30, 2013. 
 
Céline Allard, Petya Koeva Brooks, John C. Bluedorn, Fabian Bornhorst, Katharine 
 Christopherson, Franziska Ohnsorge, Tigran Poghosyan, “Toward a Fiscal Union 
 for the Euro Area,” IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/09, September 2013, 4. 
 
Charles Goyette, “The Dollar Meltdown: Surviving the Impending Currency Crisis with 
 Gold, Oil, and Other Unconventional Investments,” (New York, New York: 
 Penguin Group, 2009). 
 
Congressional Budget Office, Monthly Budget Review—Summary for Fiscal Year 2013, 
 November 2013, 
 http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44716-
 %20MBR_FY2013_0.pdf. 
 
 Millikin 39 
David Williams, “The Evolution of the Sterling System,” in C.R. Whitlesey and J.S.G 
 Wilson, eds, Essays in Money and Banking, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
 1968), 268. 
 
Edward Lutwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
 Commerce,” The National Interest, 20, 1990, 1-19. 
 
Emmanuel Farhi, Pierre Olivier-Gourinchas, Helene Rey, “Reforming the International 
 Monetary System,” Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2011, 1-78. 
 
European Central Bank, “Press Release-ECB and the People’s Bank of China Establish a 
 Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement,” October 10, 2013, 
 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2013/html/pr131010.en.html 
 
European Commission, “Fact Sheet: Facts and Figures on EU-China Trade, October 
 2013,” October 2013, 
 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144591.pdf 
 
Francis E. Warnock, Veronica Cacdac Warnock, “International Capital Flows and U.S. 
 Interest Rates,” Journal of International Money and Finance 28, (2009), 903–919. 
 
Giulio M. Gallarotti, “The Anatomy of an International Monetary Regime: The Classical 
 Gold Standard 1880-1914,” (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 
 Inc., 1995). 
 
Gyula Csurgai, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: Strategies of Geo-Economic Power   
  Projections,” in Otto Hieronymi (ed.), Globalization and the Reform of the  
  International and Banking and Monetary System, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1- 
  20. 
 
Helen Thompson, “Debt and Power: The United States' Debt in Historical Perspective,” 
 International Relations 21, 2007. 
 
International Monetary Fund, “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange 
 Reserves,” http://www.imf.org/External/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.html, (accessed 
 November 4, 2013). 
 
International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 
 Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2011. 
 
James D Sidaway, “Asia–Europe–United States: the Geoeconomics of Uncertainty,” 
Royal Geographical Society, (37.4), 2005, 373–377. 
 
James Rickards, “Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis,” (New York, 
 New York: Penguin Group, 2012), 1-255. 
 
 Millikin 40 
Jean-François Gagné, “Geopolitics in a Post-Cold War Context: From Geo-Strategic to 
 Geo-Economic Considerations?” Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and 
 Diplomatic Studies Occasional Paper No. 15, 2007, 1-21. 
 
John Maynard Keynes, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money 
 (London: Macmillan, 1936). 
 
John Williamson, “Understanding Special Drawing Rights (SDRs),” Peterson Institute 
 for International Economics Policy Brief No. Number PB09-11, June 2009, 2. 
 
Katherine Forslund, interviewed by Cullen Millikin, October 27, 2013. 
 
Lawrence Summers, “The U.S. Current Account Deficit and the Global Economy,” The 
 Per Jacobsson Foundation Lecture, October 3, 2004, 8. 
 
Lee Buchheit, “The Eurozone Debt Crisis and the Greek Debt Restructuring,” 
 (presentation, Graduate Institute of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland, November 12, 
 2013). 
 
Markus Jaeger, “Yuan as a Reserve Currency,” Deutsche Bank Research Briefing, 2010. 
 
Maurice Obstfeld, Jay Shambaugh, Alan Taylor, 2010, “Financial Stability, the 
Trilemma, and International Reserves,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 
American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 57-94. 
 
McKinsey & Company, “An Exorbitant Privelege? Implications of Reserve Currencies 
 for Competitiveness,” McKinsey Global Institute Discussion Paper, December 
 2009, 1-49. 
 
Menzie Chinn, Jeffrey Frankel, “Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Leading 
 International Reserve Currency?” The National Bureau of Economic Research 
 Working Paper No. 11510, August 2005, http://www.nber.org/papers/w11510 
 
National People’s Congress, China's Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011- 2015), translation by 
 the Delegation of the European Union in China, 
 http://www.britishchamber.cn/content/chinas-twelfth-five-year-plan-2011-2015-
 full-english-version 
 
Niccolo Machiavelli, “The Prince,” (New York, New York: The Macmillan Company, 
 1916), Chapter 10. 
 
Nicolas Jabko, “Which Economic Governance for the European Union? Facing up to the 
 Problem of Divided Sovereignty,” Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 
 2011, http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/2011_2_1.pdf. 
 
 Millikin 41 
Paul R. Krugman and Maurice Obstfeld, “The International Monetary System 1870-
 1973,” International Economics: Theory and Policy, Sixth Edition, (Reading, 
 Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 2003). 
 
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Hélène Rey, “From World Banker to World Venture 
 Capitalist: U.S. External Adjustment and the Exorbitant Privilege,” The National 
 Bureau of Economic Research 7, (2007), 11-65. 
 
Raphael Kaplinsky, Mike Morris, “Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with 
 Large Dragons,” European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), 2009, 551–
 569. 
 
Richard Cooper, “The Future of the Dollar,” Peterson Institute for International 
 Economics Policy Brief No. PB09-21, September 2009, 1. 
 
Roland Dannreuther, “China and Global Oil: Vulnerability and Opportunity,” 
 International Affairs 87:6 (2011) 1345–1364. 
 
Rupa Duttagupta, and Rishi Goyal, Isabelle Mateos y Lago, “The Debate on the 
 International Monetary System,” IMF Staff Position Note No. 2009/26, November 
 11, 2009, 5. 
 
Samuel Huntington, “The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?” Council on Foreign Relations: 
 Foreign Affairs, Winter 1988/1989, Accessed November 5, 2013, 
 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/43988/samuel-p-huntington/the-us-
 decline-or-renewal. 
 
Simon Denyer, “China’s Ousted Official Bo Xilai Convicted of Corruption, Sentenced to 
 Life in Prison,” The Washington Post, September 2013, 
 http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-21/world/42299843_1_bo-xilai-
 wang-lijun-gu-kailai 
 
Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” translated by Lionel Giles (El Paso, Texas: El Paso Norte 
 Press, 2009), 108. 
 
The European Central Bank, The International Role of the Euro, July 2013, 
 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/euro-international-
 role201307en.pdf?f4c76471697141917926e0f0011372ee 
 
The International Monetary Fund, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) Fact Sheet, October 
 2013, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm 
 
The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary 
 Union, 
 http://www.eurozone.europa.eu/media/304649/st00tscg26_en12.pdf 
 
 Millikin 42 
The World Bank, “Current Account Balance (% of GDP),” 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS, (accessed on 
 October 28, 2013). 
 
The World Bank, World Development Indicators, GDP per capita (current US$), 
 Accessed November 12, 2013, 
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
 
The World Economic Forum, “The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report: Building a 
 More Competitive Europe,” Insight Report, 2012, 31, 
 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/CSI/2012/Europe2020_Competitiveness_Report_
 2012.pdf 
 
The World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index Scores and Rankings, 2013, 
 http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index-data 
 
The World Trade Organization, International Trade and Market Access Data, Accessed 
 November 14, 2013, 
 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_bis_e.htm?solution=WTO&path
 =/Dashboards/MAPS&file=Map.wcdf&bookmarkState={%22impl%22:%22clien
 t%22,%22params%22:{%22langParam%22:%22en%22}} 
 
U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of International Affairs, Report to Congress on 
 International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies, October 13, 2013, 
 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/exchange-rate-
 policies/Documents/2013-10-30_FULL%20FX%20REPORT_FINAL.pdf 
 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities,” 
 August 2013, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-
 center/tic/Documents/mfh.txt) 
 
World Economic Forum, “Euro, Dollar, Yuan Uncertainties: Scenarios on the Future of 
 the International Monetary System,” World Scenario Series, 2012 
 
Zhou Xiaochuan, “Reform the International Monetary System,” published in Bank For 
 International Settlements Review 4, March 2009, 
 http://www.bis.org/review/r090402c.pdf. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
